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What’s so social about Social Return on Investment? A critique of quantitative 
social accounting approaches drawing on experiences of international 
microfinance 
 
Abstract 
 
Quantitative approaches figure prominently in social accounting and auditing. This is 
because of the preference among many investors for simple and ostensibly robust and 
comparative metrics. Social Return on Investment (SROI), which produces a 
monetised value for social impact generated per unit of currency invested, has 
emerged as one of the dominant tools to generate such metrics. This article discusses 
the merits of this increasing orientation towards quantitative metrics in social 
accounting using SROI as an exemplar and drawing on an extensive review of social 
impact evaluations in microfinance. The microfinance sector represents an interesting 
and relevant case for social accounting because it has been strongly orientated 
towards quantitative and experimental methods to evaluate its non-financial 
performance. The article concludes that, despite using sophisticated methods, the 
microfinance sector struggles to credibly determine its impact on customers. Self- and 
MFI selection biases cast doubts on the merits of using national benchmark indicators 
or control groups. Consequently, it is argued that SROI is better viewed as a means of 
claiming symbolic legitimacy (as per Luke, Barraket, and Eversole 2013) than as a 
robust method for evidencing social impact or a tool for managers and investors.  
 
Key words: Social accounting and auditing; Social impact reporting; Social Return 
on Investment; Microfinance 
 
Introduction 
 
Social accounting and auditing (SAA) constitute an important framework for 
demonstrating social and non-financial performance, contribution and impact of 
mission-driven organisations for investors and stakeholders. This is because 
conventional financial accounting undervalues or fails to capture the contribution 
made by these organisations. Social auditing can be defined as: 
 
…a voluntary, ongoing, embedded organizational process, internally 
controlled but externally verified, that involves stakeholders in the 
measurement and reporting of their perceptions of the organization’s social 
performance to internal and external stakeholders (Greenwood and Kamoche 
2013, 725, emphasis in original) 
 
One of the most influential methods within SAA is Social Return on Investment 
(SROI), which monetises social outcomes and expresses them as a ratio related to the 
investment made (i.e. value generated per unit invested). The ascension of SROI is an 
outcome and manifestation of the wider appeal of quantitative methods and metrics. 
Quantitative approaches are believed to produce simple and ostensibly comparative 
and robust metrics that enables benchmarking and a seemingly objective basis for 
performance management. For these reasons, SROI is ‘popular in the impact 
investment community’ (Ebrahim and Rangan 2014, 134). Yet quantitative metrics do 
not necessarily fit easily with the complexity of social outcomes. It is often difficult to 
find standardised and comparative data that meaningfully capture social outcomes 
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(Frumkin 2003; Gibbon and Dey 2011).This article draws on a critical examination of 
the attempts to identify and quantify the impact of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) to 
critique SROI. As such it aims to make a contribution to understanding the tensions in 
the increasing orientation towards quantitative approaches. The experience of the 
microfinance sector is relevant and fruitful because it represents a large mission-
driven sector that has drawn extensively on quantitative approaches to demonstrate its 
social performance. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised into five sections. The second section 
outlines the background, assumptions, purpose and application of SROI. The third 
discusses impact assessments within microfinance, while the fourth sets out the main 
methodological lessons that can be drawn from these assessments. The final section 
concludes with a discussion of the role and potential applications of SROI in light of 
these methodological lessons. 
 
Social Return on Investment 
 
SROI was developed in the US in the late 1990s by the Roberts Enterprise 
Development Fund (REDF) to capture and monetise the full value creation of its 
employment programme and has since become one of the dominant social 
performance frameworks in the social enterprise sector (Gibbon and Dey 2011). The 
SROI methodology developed REDF was based on a blended value model, which 
stated that an organisation could achieve both economic success and social benefits 
(Gair 2002). The SROI was subsequently adapted for the UK by the New Economics 
Foundation (NEF) which devised a 10-stage approach (Somers et al. 2005). The 
model was adapted to a six-stage methodology by the Cabinet Office (Nicholls et al. 
2009). 
 
The SROI methodology is claimed to fulfil a number of purposes. First, SROI is 
claimed to be a management tool that can be used to enhance the impact of the 
organisation by channelling organisational efforts and resources into high-impact 
activities (Nicholls et al. 2009). In fact, one of the ways in which SROI is believed to 
differ from cost-benefit analysis is that it is designed ‘as a practical management tool’ 
(Gibbon and Dey 2011, 2). According to the guidance issued by the Cabinet Office, 
SROI ‘can help guide choices that managers face when deciding where they should 
spend time and money’ (Nicholls et al. 2009, 10).  
 
Second, SROI is believed to constitute empirical evidence of the effectiveness and 
impact of social enterprises and their activities (Nicholls et al. 2009; Somers et al. 
2005). Arvidson et al (2010, 10) argue that ‘SROI contributes to how we can 
appreciate impact (prove).’ If a SROI analysis proves the impact of one organisation 
and its activities, then presumably a collection of SROI studies within one sector will 
inform our understanding of the extent and nature of impact of the sector as a whole.  
 
Third, SROI is claimed to be a tool for investors on which they can rely to channel 
investments into organisations and sectors that produce greater impacts in desired 
areas (Somers et al. 2005). It can also ‘help show how investment can maximise 
impact’ (Nicholls et al. 2009, 11). According to the guide on SROI by the Cabinet 
Office (Nicholls et al. 2009, 11): ‘Bodies that commission social value or invest in the 
creation of social value can use SROI initially as a way to help them decide where to 
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invest, and later to assess performance and measure progress over time.’ The SROI 
analysis can be evaluative, assessing the impact and effectiveness of an intervention, 
or a forecast to determine where to invest (Nicholls et al. 2009). 
 
SROI is in many respects similar to the classical cost-benefit (Arvidson et al. 2010; 
Gibbon and Dey 2011). In an SROI analysis the emphasis is on identifying outcomes 
related to the investment made, which is then expressed as a ratio in the form of the 
value generated per unit of currency invested, net of cost. SROI involves the 
quantification and comparison of costs and benefits, and the benefits must outweigh 
the costs to warrant investment in the activity in question. Similar to the cost-benefit 
analysis, SROI involves estimating future benefits and costs, and arriving at a figure 
expressed in current terms by using discounting. In both methods, the costs and 
benefits are expressed as monetary units, and they can be tangible (e.g. price of asset, 
income from service) or intangible (e.g. increased well-being) (Gair 2002). However, 
SROI differs from the cost-benefit analysis in some important respects, such as 
greater emphasis on stakeholder involvement (Arvidson et al. 2010) and greater use as 
a management tool (Gibbon and Dey 2011). 
 
One of the most important aspects of SROI is that it links the services and products of 
an organisation with outcomes for individuals and groups that are not part of the 
organisation. On the one hand, there are the financial inputs (i.e. investment, costs) 
that relate to the organisation. On the other, there are the monetised social outputs that 
relate to individuals and groups that benefit from service. This differentiates it from 
financial returns, such as return on equity and return on assets, which are calculated 
from components internal to the organisation, though they will be affected by external 
factors.  
 
This link makes isolating the impact of the intervention or services in question – by 
linking the services provided the organisation to the outcomes of the recipients – of 
great importance. As a method, SROI relies on a non-experimental approach using 
control groups or a benchmark to determine what would have happened in the 
absence of the intervention (i.e. deadweight) (Nicholls et al. 2009; Somers et al. 
2005). According to the SROI guide by the Office of the Third Sector: ‘To calculate 
deadweight, reference is made to comparison groups or benchmarks...you need to 
seek out information that is as close to your population as possible. The more similar 
the comparison group, the better the estimate will be’ (Nicholls et al. 2009, 56). 
 
In addition, a SROI analysis should consider displacement and the duration of the 
impact (i.e. drop-off and discounting). Finally, the analyst must consider what 
proportion of the change is attributable to the organisation. These are used to convert 
the outcomes identified, described, quantified and collected in the first steps of the 
process into actual impacts. There is also a general emphasis on basing all 
assumptions, as far as possible, on empirical evidence (Nicholls et al. 2009).  
 
Although SROI takes into account some negative externalities, discounting and 
displacement, which may, in theory, lead to a negative impact, the underlying 
assumption is that, at the core, there is a positive impact and that the organisation is, 
in part, responsible for that impact (Arvidson et al. 2010; Nicholls et al. 2009; Ryan 
and Lyne 2008). If a particular outcome is identified as a likely or intended impact at 
the start of the process then it is given a positive value which is then reduced through 
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discounting, displacement and assignment of attribution. Ryan and Lyne (2008, 223) 
argue that the failure of applying SROI-type analysis leads to a disregard for the 
benefits produced by the social enterprise sector: 
 
The partial application of these techniques [classical cost-benefit analysis] to 
social enterprise is possible, because they often sell a product or a service, but 
they fail to capture adequately the additional social value added by the 
activities of social enterprises. This is important because the true value of 
investment in social enterprise is often understated or even unrecognised 
 
A major issue with the SROI methodology is that it does not allow for comparisons 
between different studies and interventions (Emerson and Cabaj 2000; Gibbon and 
Dey 2011). This is because studies apply different ratios and techniques for estimating 
deadweight and attribution, and apply different time periods and discounting rates 
(Banke-Thomas et al. 2015; Luke, Barraket, and Eversole 2013). This problem is 
compounded by the emphasis on monetising social outcomes that cannot be easily 
monetised (Frumkin 2003). Gibbon and Dey (2011, 63) note that the ‘use of such 
proxies is highly subjective, especially when dealing with “softer” outcomes.’ 
 
Luke, Barraket, and Eversole (2013) argue that SROI is used to quantify measures in 
order to claim symbolic legitimacy rather than to generate substantive information on 
actual performance. They argue that the value of SROI performance calculations and 
measures can be improved by restricting the analysis to ‘clearly identifiable and 
reliable measurable costs and benefits’ (Luke, Barraket, and Eversole 2013, 242). 
Furthermore, they recommend using measures drawing on internationally recognised 
accounting principles comparable across time and organisations as well as including 
opportunity costs. Banke-Thomas et al (2015) add that SROI studies should provide 
justification for discount rates used in models, rely on PPP equivalent and incorporate 
case-control or before and after designs to account for outcomes.  
 
Microfinance Impact Assessments 
 
Driven largely by investors and funders, quantitative approaches have dominated the 
evaluation of social performance of the international microfinance sector. 
Consequently, studies of the impact of MFIs and the methodological considerations of 
such studies probably constitute the largest body of peer-reviewed research outputs in 
the field of microfinance. As with SROI, these evaluations attempt to link the services 
provided by an organisation to the outcomes for the recipients. 
 
The most widely used method of isolating the impact of microcredits from other 
potential sources of change has been to use a control group. Among the most common 
approaches of selecting a control group has been to select non-client households with 
similar observable socioeconomic characteristics (e.g. quality of housing, ownership 
and size arable land) (Meyer 2008). Often these non-client households are from an 
area without an MFI branch as MFIs may have spillover effects beyond the client 
households (employment opportunities created by client businesses). Another method 
to isolate the impact of microcredits has been to compare clients with incipient or 
pipeline clients (i.e. households whose applications have been approved but have yet 
to receive a loan). The perceived advantage of this approach is that incipient and 
pipeline clients may be expected to be more similar to existing clients than non-clients 
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as they have actively sought credit and have been approved unlike non-clients 
(Mosley and Rock 2004). Numerous studies show that clients tend to be wealthier 
than non-clients (e.g. McKernan 2002; Pitt et al. 1999). 
 
Over the past few years, these two approaches have been heavily criticised for not 
controlling for two important selection biases (Meyer 2008). First, there is the so-
called self-selection bias, which implies that the households that resort to 
microfinance may be inherently different from households that do not make use of 
microfinance. Many of these differences may be unobservable, such as risk aversion 
and entrepreneurial acumen. This also applies to pipeline or incipient clients, as the 
fact that they have sought finance later than the established clients may indicate 
differences in risk aversion level and entrepreneurial acumen. This problem may be 
circumvented by using a control location, though this does not control for the MFI-
selection bias discussed below. 
 
Second, there is the MFI –or programme-selection bias. The selection of areas to 
operate in and clients by MFIs is not a random process. Clients are selected through a 
careful screening process to establish creditworthiness, so the likelihood of success 
may be a pre-condition rather than an outcome of access to credit (Gaile and Foster 
1996). Comparing non-clients and clients may thus produce a biased result. Similarly, 
the selection of an area to set up an MFI office or branch is also likely to be based on 
an assessment of need and feasibility and therefore not random. Thus even where the 
researcher operates with a control location there is a risk of bias because there may be 
inherent differences between an MFI-location and a control location. 
 
The best way to circumvent these biases, according to these critics, is to move 
towards an experimental research design where the access to credit or location of MFI 
is random (Meyer 2008). These studies are called randomised or experimental impact 
assessments. In theory, by randomising access to MFI services, a comparison of 
recipients and non-recipients will yield a more accurate estimate of impact. In practice 
such experimental studies are often difficult to conduct. Few studies are truly 
randomised and most use so-called near-creditworthy MFI applicants (Fernald et al. 
2008; Augsburg et al. 2015) or residents in areas randomly given an MFI branch 
(Coleman 1999; Angelucci, Karlan, and Zinman 2015) in their experiments. 
 
Table 1 provides an overview of microfinance impact assessments by impact area, 
geographical area and whether study is experimental or not. 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
In most cases, non-randomised studies find an impact in the intended direction. In 
particular, microfinance has been found to have an impact on female empowerment, 
poverty, income, and household consumption and expenditure. Some of these studies 
have also found remarkably large impact of microcredit. In one of the most extensive 
impact assessments in Bangladesh, Khandker et al (1998) find that 5% of client 
households rose above the poverty line, which is an astonishing result especially 
given that the MFIs in question are largely self-sustaining. Amin et al (1994) find 
greater use and knowledge of contraceptives among microfinance clients in 
Bangladesh because of greater involvement of women in income generating activity. 
This finding seems echoed by Hashemi et al (1996), who detect significant impact of 
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MFI membership on female empowerment in part through creating opportunities for 
women to earn independent incomes. 
 
However, subsequent studies start recognising the potential shortcomings of simple 
comparisons between clients and non-clients. McKernan (2002), for example, argues 
that researchers may be introducing a considerable bias and overestimating effects of 
participation on profits because more profitable households are more likely to 
participate in the first place. Controlling for such bias, McKernan nevertheless finds 
positive and significant effects of participation on business profits. Similarly, Pitt et al 
(1999) analyse the dataset of Khandker et al applying a set of controls for choice-
based sampling, self-selection and non-random programme placement, and find no 
impact of microcredit on female fertility and some impact on male fertility. They 
show that statistical analyses not controlling for these biases produce biased results. 
 
Because of the potential biases in impact assessments drawing on comparisons 
between clients and non-clients, there has generally been a move towards so-called 
randomised or experimental studies. There have been two types of such studies. First, 
there have been studies based on comparing households in areas randomly allocated 
an MFI branch. This was first done by Coleman (1999) in Thailand who found no 
significant impacts of microfinance on the households or businesses. This has since 
been replicated in a number of studies (e.g. Tarozzi, Desai, and Johnson 2015; 
Attanasio et al. 2015; Crépon et al. 2015; Banerjee et al. 2015). The second type of 
randomised studies randomly allocates credit or a review of the application to 
applicants marginally not meeting the lending criteria (Fernald et al. 2008; Augsburg 
et al. 2015; Karlan and Zinman 2010). These randomised studies suggest that there is 
an over-estimation of impact in simple comparisons with control group or 
benchmarks. Especially, these studies cannot find any evidence for transformational 
impacts on poverty shown in early, non-randomised studies. Randomised studies do 
show some positive impacts on business profits, income and investment. However, 
they also uncover important negative impacts on health, asset endowment and 
indebtedness.  
 
Implications and lessons for SROI 
 
The most salient observation from the review of the microfinance literature is that 
straightforward comparisons of clients and non-clients do not necessarily reflect true 
impact. The difficulty is selecting a control group similar to the treatment group (i.e. 
microfinance clients) in all aspects save the use of microfinance to isolate the impact 
of microcredits. After all, the access to microcredits is the outcome of a screening 
process by an institution that may have carefully selected a location to operate. 
Moreover the borrowing household has itself decided to take out the loan and may 
differ from the control group household on a number of unobservable traits such as 
risk aversion, entrepreneurial acumen and initiative.  
 
However, the extent to which this observation applies to other sectors is likely to 
depend on the level of user initiative required to access the service and the level of 
screening required to grant access. It is argued that the experience and evidence from 
the microfinance impact evaluations may apply in circumstances in which the access 
to services requires high levels of user initiative and is subject to high levels of 
screening (Figure 1).  
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FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
This is because these two characteristics are likely to increase self-selection and 
programme-selection biases. First, where the access to services is rationed and subject 
to screening of potential clients or targeting of a particular set of clients, there is a risk 
of programme-selection bias distorting simple comparisons with benchmarks or non-
random control groups. In other words, the granting of access to a service is not 
random but the outcome of a purposive selection process. In some cases, services may 
be reserved for clients within the target group that will be able to make the most of the 
service in question. This may, for example, often be the case for enterprise support 
where services may be offered to people with viable business propositions or with 
entrepreneurial potential. In these cases, the likelihood of success may be a 
precondition for access rather than an outcome of the service. This may distort any 
SROI analysis because the treatment group will be more likely to succeed than the 
control group or benchmark. 
 
Second, the level of initiative and interest required on part of the user or his or her 
network may determine the extent to which a non-randomised research design biases 
results. Users of some services will actively have to seek out the service provided by 
the organisation or the inclusion of someone in a particular programme or intervention 
may be the result of resourceful relatives and networks. These people may well be 
inherently different from those that chose not to access these services. For example, 
the people attending pension club lunches aimed at reducing isolation, may, based on 
the fact that they have actively sought to participate in such events, be more inclined 
to socialise than those that chose not to participate. Comparing the attendees of these 
lunches with non-participants is likely to inflate the impact of the intervention on the 
users. This may make any comparison with a non-randomised control group biased. 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
The popularity of SROI, compared with many other social accounting tools, in 
measuring and reporting social impact of mission-driven organisations is linked to the 
enduring appeal of quantitative methods and metrics. Statistical data appear more 
robust and scientific compared with ‘softer’, qualitative measures, and lend 
themselves to standardisation and, hence, benchmarking of performance. Yet it is 
often difficult to find standardised and comparative data that meaningfully capture 
social outcomes (Frumkin 2003; Gibbon and Dey 2011). This article delves into these 
arguments through critiquing SROI based on an extensive review of impact 
evaluations in the microfinance sector, which has used quantitative methods to assess 
it social performance to a greater degree than perhaps any other sector. 
 
It concludes that, for all the methodological sophistication of these impact 
evaluations, the link between the services provided by MFIs and outcomes for 
customers remains elusive. This is because of the difficulty in distinguishing between 
inherent characteristics of users and outcomes generated by the access to 
microfinance. This, it is argued, casts doubts on the robustness of SROI as 
methodology to assess social impact. SROI relies on comparisons between 
beneficiaries and benchmark rates or control groups and then subtracting deadweight 
(what would have happened in the absence of the intervention) and displacement 
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(crowding out effects). Yet, experimental studies in microfinance suggest that simple 
comparisons with non-users and benchmarks lead to overestimates of impact, and 
disregard the possibility that a service may have a negative impact. This is especially 
likely to be the case where access to services is subject to screening and where the 
user has to exercise considerable initiative in accessing services. In these cases, the 
starting point (i.e. the difference between users and the benchmark) may be biased 
and applying deadweight and displacement will not necessarily address this.  
 
Consequently, investors should exercise caution in using SROI to determine the 
activities in which they invest, as a higher or lower SROI does not necessarily reflect 
greater or lesser social impact. As argued by Gibbon and Dey (2011, 64), singularly 
focusing on SROI ‘may lead to a one-dimensional and arguably “dumbed-down” 
portrayal of the organisation’s activities.’ This also questions the usefulness of SROI 
as a management tool to guide the activities into which an organisation puts its 
efforts. In light of the problems of selecting a control group in non-experimental 
research, a higher SROI may reflect targeting and client selection rather than impact. 
Thus, an organisation wanting to boost investment and its SROI score may boost its 
score by targeting clients more likely to succeed. 
 
Instead, practitioners may want to focus on enhancing their understanding of the 
trajectories and typologies of users. For example, in terms of microfinance, business 
support or employment schemes, case studies of users who stay unemployed or whose 
business fails combined with quantitative data on clients, may enable them to target 
post-service support at groups more likely to fail (timing, design of services). Where 
possible, investors should draw on the findings of randomised studies on the impact of 
the sector or activity to inform realistic expectations of the potential impact, including 
potential pitfalls, limitations and negative effects, of the activities of an organisation 
in which the investor is considering to invest. In addition, investors may find metrics 
on the beneficiaries (e.g. how well institution reaches target group, how well meets 
needs of most vulnerable groups) and on the institution itself (e.g. effective 
governance to prevent mission drift, efficiency of organisation) more reliable proxies 
social performance than SROI. 
 
Where then does that leave SROI? Rather than attempting to make SROI more robust 
by incorporating case-control and justification for discount rates as suggested by 
Banke-Thomas et al (2015) or by relying on international accounting standards for 
measures as recommended by Luke et al (2013), there should be greater recognition 
of its limitations. It is argued that the role of SROI in context of social accounting is 
in claiming symbolic legitimacy, as per Luke et al (2013), for activities with no 
obvious or immediate pecuniary value. As such, it can help fulfil the role of social 
accounting ‘as a “societal” accountability mechanism’ (David et al. 2010, 956) by 
highlighting the potential monetary value of social outcomes. 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Amin, Ruhul, A. U. Ahmed, J. Chowdhury, and M. Ahmed. 1994. "Poor women's 
participation in income-generating projects and their fertility regulation in rural 
Bangladesh: Evidence from a recent survey."  World Development 22 (4):555-565. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(94)90111-2. 
9 
 
Angelucci, Manuella, Dean Karlan, and Jonathan Zinman. 2015. "Microcredit 
Impacts: Evidence from a Randomized Microcredit Program Placement Experiment 
by Compartamos Banco."  American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 7 
(1):151-182. 
Arvidson, Malin., Fergus. Lyon, Stephen. McKay, and Domenico. Moro. 2010. "The 
ambitions and challenges of SROI."  Third Sector Research Centre Working Paper 
(49). 
Attanasio, Orazio, Britta Augsburg , Ralph De Haas, Emla Fitzsimons, and Heike 
Harmgart. 2015. "The Impacts of Microfinance: Evidence from Joint-Liability 
Lending in Mongolia."  American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 7 (1):90-
122. 
Augsburg, Britta, Ralph De Haas, Heike Harmgart, and Costas Meghir. 2015. "The 
Impacts of Microcredit: Evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina."  American 
Economic Journal: Applied Economics 7 (1):183-203. 
Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Cynthia Kinnan. 2015. "The 
Miracle of Microfinance? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation."  American 
Economic Journal: Applied Economics 7 (1):22-53. doi: http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-
applied/. 
Banke-Thomas, Aduragbemi Oluwabusayo, Barbara Madaj, Ameh Charles, and 
Nynke van den Broek. 2015. "Social Return on Investment (SROI) methodology to 
account for value for money of public health interventions: a systematic review."  
BMC Public Health 15 (1):1-14. doi: 10.1186/s12889-015-1935-7. 
Coleman, Brett E. 1999. "The impact of group lending in Northeast Thailand."  
Journal of Development Economics 60 (1):105-141. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(99)00038-3. 
Crépon, Bruno, Florencia Devoto, Esther Duflo, and William Parienté. 2015. 
"Estimating the Impact of Microcredit on Those Who Take It Up: Evidence from a 
Randomized Experiment in Morocco."  American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics 7 (1):123-150. 
David, Collison, Dey Colin, Hannah Gwen, and Stevenson Lorna. 2010. "Anglo-
American capitalism: the role and potential role of social accounting."  Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal 23 (8):956-981. doi: 
10.1108/09513571011092510. 
Ebrahim, Alnoor, and V. Kasturi Rangan. 2014. "What impact? Aframework for 
measuring the scale and scope of social performance."  California Management 
Review 56 (3):118-141. doi: 10.1525/cmr.2014.56.3.118. 
Emerson, J., and M. Cabaj. 2000. "Social Return on Investment."  Making Waves 11 
(2):10-14. 
Fernald, Lia C. H., Rita Hamad, Dean Karlan, Emily J. Ozer, and Jonathan Zinman. 
2008. "Small individual loans and mental health: a randomized controlled trial among 
10 
 
South African adults."  BMC Public Health 8:409-409. doi: 10.1186/1471-2458-8-
409. 
Frumkin, Peter. 2003. "Inside Venture Philanthropy."  Society 40 (4):7-15. 
Gaile, G. L., and J. Foster. 1996. Review of Methodological Approaches to the Study 
of the Impact of Microenterprise Credit Programs. AIMS. 
Gair, C. 2002. A Report From the Good Ship SROI. The Roberts Foundation. 
Gibbon, Jane, and Colin Dey. 2011. "Developments in Social Impact Measurement in 
the Third Sector: Scaling Up or Dumbing Down?"  Social and Environmental 
Accountability Journal 31 (1):63-72. doi: 10.1080/0969160X.2011.556399. 
Greenwood, Michelle, and Ken Kamoche. 2013. "Social accounting as stakeholder 
knowledge appropriation."  J Manag Gov 17 (3):723-743. doi: 10.1007/s10997-011-
9208-z. 
Hashemi, Syed M., Sidney Ruth Schuler, and Ann P. Riley. 1996. "Rural credit 
programs and women's empowerment in Bangladesh."  World Development 24 
(4):635-653. doi: 10.1016/0305-750X(95)00159-A. 
Hossain, Mahabub. 1990. "Credit for alleviation of rural poverty: the Grameen bank 
in Bangladesh."  Community development journal 25 (2):89. 
Kaboski, Joseph P., and Robert M. Townsend. 2005. "POLICIES AND IMPACT: AN 
ANALYSIS OF VILLAGE‐ LEVEL MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS."  Journal 
of the European Economic Association 3 (1):1-50. doi: 10.1162/1542476053295331. 
Karlan, Dean, and Jonathan Zinman. 2010. "Expanding Credit Access: Using 
Randomized Supply Decisions to Estimate the Impacts."  Review of Financial Studies 
23 (1):433-464. doi: http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year. 
Khandker, Shahidur R., Hussain A. Samad, and Zahed H. Khan. 1998. "Income and 
employment effects of micro‐credit programmes: Village‐level evidence from 
Bangladesh."  The Journal of Development Studies 35 (2):96-124. doi: 
10.1080/00220389808422566. 
Luke, Belinda, Jo Barraket, and Robyn Eversole. 2013. "Measurement as legitimacy 
versus legitimacy of measures: Performance evaluation of social enterprise."  
Qualitative Research in Accounting & Management 10 (3/4):234-258. doi: 
10.1108/QRAM-08-2012-0034. 
Masud Ahmed, Syed, Mushtaque Chowdhury, and Abbas Bhuiya. 2001. "Micro- 
Credit and Emotional Well- Being: Experience of Poor Rural Women from Matlab, 
Bangladesh."  World Development 29 (11):1957-1966. doi: 10.1016/S0305-
750X(01)00069-9. 
McKernan, Signe-Mary. 2002. "The Impact of Microcredit Programs on Self- 
Employment Profits: Do Noncredit Program Aspects Matter?"  The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 84 (1):93-115. 
11 
 
Meyer, R. L. 2008. "Measuring the impact of microfinance." In What’s wrong with 
microfinance, edited by T. Dichter and M. Harper, 208-225. Rugby: Intermediate 
Technology Publications Ltd. 
Mohindra, K., S. Haddad, and D. Narayana. 2008. "Can microcredit help improve the 
health of poor women? Some findings from a cross-sectional study in Kerala, India."  
International Journal for Equity in Health 7 (2). 
Mosley, Paul, and June Rock. 2004. "Microfinance, labour markets and poverty in 
Africa: a study of six institutions."  Journal of International Development 16 (3):467-
500. doi: 10.1002/jid.1090. 
Nicholls, J., E. Lawlor, E. Neitzert, and T. Goodspeed. 2009. A guide to social return 
on investment. London: Office of the Third Sector,. 
Pitt, Mark M., Shahidur R. Khandker, Signe-Mary Mckernan, and M. Abdul Latif. 
1999. "Credit programs for the poor and reproductive behavior in low-income 
countries: Are the reported causal relationships the result of heterogeneity bias?"  
Demography 36 (1):1-21. 
Ryan, Patrick W., and Isaac Lyne. 2008. "Social enterprise and the measurement of 
social value: methodological issues with the calculation and application of the social 
return on investment."  Education, Knowledge and Economy 2 (3):223-237. doi: 
10.1080/17496890802426253. 
Smith, Stephen C. 2002. "Village Banking and Maternal and Child Health: Evidence 
from Ecuador and Honduras."  World Development 30 (4):707-723. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(01)00128-0. 
Somers, Alibeth., J. Nicholls, S. Mackenzie, and L. Sanfilippo. 2005. Measuring 
value creation in Social Firms: a do-it-yourself training manual for SROI. London: 
New Economics Foundation. 
Tarozzi, Alessandro, Jaikishan Desai, and Kristin Johnson. 2015. "The Impacts of 
Microcredit: Evidence from Ethiopia."  American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics 7 (1):54-89. 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
Client 
initiative 
Screening 
High Low 
Figure 1: Organisational 
typology 
MFI
s 
13 
 
Table 1: Impact by impact area and study 
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Non-experimental / randomised studies              
(Hossain 1990) (Bangladesh)  -* + + +  +  +  - +  
(Amin et al. 1994) (Bangladesh)             - 
(Hashemi, Schuler, and Riley 1996) (Bangladesh)   +   +      +  
(Khandker, Samad, and Khan 1998) (Bangladesh) + +**   +**  + + +     
(Pitt et al. 1999) (Bangladesh)             -* 
(Masud Ahmed, Chowdhury, and Bhuiya 2001) 
(Bangladesh) 
      -**       
Zaman et al (2001) (Bangladesh) +   +    +    +  
(McKernan 2002) (Bangladesh) +             
(Smith 2002) (Ecuador & Honduras)       0/+1       
(Mosley and Rock 2004) (Africa) +     0   +     
(Kaboski and Townsend 2005) (Thailand)  0 0  0   0   -   
(Mohindra, Haddad, and Narayana 2008) (India)        +*
* 
     
                                                 
1 Positive impact in Ecuador on health for microcredit only, and positive impact for microcredit and other health interventions (bundled approach) for both countries. 
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Experimental / randomised studies              
(Coleman 1999) (Thailand) 0 0  0 0  0  0 +**    
(Fernald et al. 2008) (South Africa)       -       
(Karlan and Zinman 2010) (Philippines) 0   +*/-2    0 +     
(Angelucci, Karlan, and Zinman 2015) (Mexico) 0 0  +   0 0      
(Attanasio et al. 2015) (Mongolia) 0 0 +**
* 
 0   +*
** 
  0   
(Augsburg et al. 2015) (Bosnia) 0 0 + +    -      
(Banerjee et al. 2015) (India)   + +   0 0 0   0  
(Crépon et al. 2015) (Morocco) 0 - + + +  0 0 0   0  
(Tarozzi, Desai, and Johnson 2015) (Ethiopia) 0 0 0 0   0 0 0   0  
Notes: * only significant for men; ** only significant for women; *** only for group lending; 
- (negative), +  (positive), 0 (no effect) 
Year and country/continent in brackets 
 
                                                 
2 Profits increase but treated businesses shrink in terms of number of employees 
